Includes bibliographical references (p. 231-241) and index.
|LC Classifications||JC585 .B363 2008|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||ix, 246 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||246|
|LC Control Number||2007043338|
Gunnar Beck provides the first comparative book-length introduction to Fichte's and Kant's theories of freedom, law, and politics, together with an overview of the metaphysical and epistemological edifice underpinning their thinking. Fichte equates absolute freedom with volition, conceived as “the free transition from determinability to determination with consciousness of the transition.”. This requires both that we be the absolute source of our actions and that we have a plurality of possible actions available to us. There, Fichte sketches an account of pure practical motivation that does not depend on direct appeal to features of self-consciousness, but is more in line with Kant's own appeal to the moral law. A. Fichte’s Earliest Account of Freedom 5 Kant’s first conception of freedom Author: Aaron Wells. In Kant's age, the word Nachdruck, 5 sometimes translated as “counterfeiting” o “piracy”, had the proper and less criminal meaning of "reprinting". The United Kingdom had passed in the first European copyright bill, the Statute of Anne, 6 which received a definitive interpretation only in , in the well-known judgment on Donaldson vs. Beckett 7 settled by the House of Lords.
Fichte and Kant on Freedom, Rights and Law By Gunnar Beck Topics: , Author: Gunnar Beck. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the ‘I’ instead through the category of community or reciprocal interaction. The result was nothing less than a radical shift in thinking about persons after Kant, yet in a way that would bear a striking affinity to the substance monism of : Owen Ware. The second non-Kantian feature of Fichtean autonomy is made explicit when Fichte says that the law of autonomy is “a law only for the I” (SW ), whereas for Kant, the principle of autonomy is “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” (Ak ). The following are the sources for the quotations from Kant used in this essay. DV: The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Harper, ).. GMM: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, in The Moral Law (Hutchinson, ). MEJ: The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, .
Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right (/97) was one of the most influential books in nineteenth-century philosophy. It was read carefully by Schelling, Hegel, and Marx, and initiated a tradition in German philosophy that considers human subjectivity to be relational and intersubjective, thus requiring relations of recognition between subjects. Abstract. It is common for Kant's rights‐based liberalism to be contrasted with the communitarian authoritarianism of the later Fichte and of Hegel, and it is the concept of autonomy that is generally regarded as the theoretical fount of Kant's theory of natural rights, providing the analytical link between Kant's moral philosophy and his political and legal theory. The author argues that Cited by: 4. Following Kant and Rousseau (by way of Kant), Fichte conceives of freedom as self-legislation or autonomy, thereby joining self-determination and self-limitation in the free enactment of the rule of reason. This chapter outlines Fichte’s achievement by pursuing the foundational and final status of freedom in his : Günter Zöller. His book Fichte and Kant on freedom, rights and law offers a new interpretation of the relationship between Kant's and Fichte's theories of freedom and their doctrines of rights, law and the state. Gunnar Beck's monograph The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU has been published by Richard Hart, Oxford.